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Original scientific paper 
The usage control model (UCON) is the latest major enhancement of traditional access control models. It enables subject and object attributes mutability 
and usage control continuity. However, with the model access permission may be denied as a result of the environmental changes even though the 
authorization and obligation requirements are met, thus causing disruptions to users. Contextual UCON (CUC) was proposed to overcome this major 
weakness of UCON. In CUC context was introduced to replace the conditions component in UCON. And management module was added to manipulate 
the subject and object and context attributes. CUC seamlessly combines control and management modules and has the ability to dynamically adapt the 
changes in context, and is truly attribute-based. An algebra approach was employed to describe CUC syntax and semantics formally. 
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Kontekstualni model praćenja uporabe  
 
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
Model praćenja uporabe (UCON) je najnovije veliko poboljšanje tradicionalnih modela za praćenje pristupa. On omogućava promjenljivost atributa 
subjekta i objekta i kontinuitet praćenja uporabe. Međutim, taj model može zabraniti pristup zbog promjena u okolini čak i ako su zadovoljeni zahtjevi 
autorizacije i obveze te tako korisnicima stvoriti prekide. Predložen je kontekstualni UCON (CUC) kako bi se prevladala ta osnovna slabost UCONa. U 
CUC-u se uvodi kontekst kao zamjena za komponentu uvjeta u UCON-u. Dodaje se modul upravljanja za manipuliranje atributima subjekta, objekta i 
konteksta. CUC izravno kombinira module praćenja i upravljanja i može dinamički prilagođavati promjene u kontekstu te je uistinu baziran na atributima. 
Primijenjen je algebarski pristup za opis sintakse i semantike CUCa.  
 
Ključne riječi: IT (Informacijska tehnologija), kontekst, praćenje pristupa, sigurnost računala, UCON 
 
 
1     Introduction 
  
Access control is one of the basic and critical 
technologies for information security. It works with other 
security services in information systems to provide 
information security. Access control is basically an 
everyday phenomenon and has a long history. A pair of 
lock and key, for example, is a typical form of access 
control. Modern access control technology was 
impregnated in late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Lampson 
first gave a formal description for the access control 
mechanism by introducing the concepts of the subject, 
object and access matrix [1]. Over the past 40 years, a lot 
of access control models were developed, such as Bell-La 
Padula (BLP) Model, Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman (HRU) 
Model, Biba Integrity Model, Clark-Wilson Integrity 
Model, Chinese Wall Model, Clinical Information 
Systems Security Policy Model, Role-Based Access 
Control model (RBAC), Usage CONtrol model (UCON ), 
and so on [2].  
The UCON proposed by Park et al. is an important 
advance since RBAC [3 ÷ 6]. It was recognized as the 
latest major enhancement of the classic access control 
models, and drew considerable interests and attentions. 
For example, by the time this paper was written, about 
3000 records related with UCON were returned by the 
keywords "usage control" (in Chinese) or UCON on 
China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (CNKI). 
After they surveyed the literatures on usage control over 
the period 2002 to 2010, Lazouski et al. found that 
research on UCON is still active, and some research 
issues are open and need more work [7].  
The original UCON is made of six core components: 
subjects (with attributes), objects (with attributes), rights, 
authorizations, obligations, and conditions [8]. The first 
three components are inherited from traditional access 
control models, and have similar meanings. The last three 
are new components for usage control decisions. 
Authorization permits or rejects a subject request based 
on the evaluation of the subject and/or the object 
attributes under conditions. Obligations are requirements 
a subject has to perform before or during his/her access. 
Conditions are system and environment constraints for 
decision, and independent of both subjects and objects 
attributes [4, 5]. However, as [4, 5] pointed, condition 
variables of UCON are not mutable. UCON aims to 
enable subject and object attributes mutability and control 
continuity. Because of the decision continuity, the access 
permission may be denied as a result of the environmental 
changes even though the authorization and obligation 
requirements are met. This major weakness is rooted at 
the static conditions variables. As the rapid development 
of modern computing and information technology, the 
application environments become more and more 
complex and varied. For example, in a cloud computing 
environment, the equipment, the systems, the platforms or 
even the organizations are virtualized. To make an access 
control effective, it is necessary to dynamically adapt the 
changes in environments, so as to ensure continuity of 
usage.  
Some recent researches were implemented to improve 
the UCON model. For example, Zhao et al. introduced a 
time variable into UCON, called as TUCON (Times-
based Usage Control) [9]. Zhang Hong-jun added 
geospatial factor into UCON to ensure the spatial 
characteristics of location-aware application security [10]. 
Bai et al. proposed ConUCON (context-aware usage 
control model) for data and resource protection in mobile 
computing environment [11], and applied it to improve 
security protection for WoT (Web of Things) [12]. 
Almutairi and Siewe employ context information to make 
UCON context-aware in pervasive computing systems 
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[13]. However, these attempts did not completely solve 
the issue.  
In this paper we introduce contexts to replace the 
conditions component in UCON to overcome the 
inadequacy of the original UCON model. This approach 
is different from those [9 ÷ 13]. In the rest of this paper, 
we first describe the concept and principle of the context 
component. Then the improvement of UCON is illustrated, 
followed by the components framework and a formal 
description by an algebra approach. Then is the 
comparison of CUC. Finally some conclusions and 
further work are presented. 
 
2     Context 
  
The word "context" derived from the Latin words con 
and texere originally means something weaved with or 
together. There are some definitions of context. In 
linguistics, for example, context is the parts of a written 
text or spoken discourse that surround a particular word 
or passage and clarify its meaning. For an event, context 
is the parts of something that perform the event setting. In 
Chinese it is also known as the origin and development of 
things to happen. 
In computer science and technology area, research on 
context and context-aware has been done in many 
literatures since Schilit et al. first introduced the concept 
of context-aware [14 ÷ 16]. The widely-accepted 
definition of context was provided by Dey [17].  
Dey’s definition is focused on entity. In a usage 
transaction, it is natural to concern the events or actions. 
In this paper action-oriented context can be explained 
below. 
Definition 1 (Context) Context is any information 
that can influence the situation of an action. Any 
information includes conditions and factors that impact, 
constrain, or relate to the occurrence, development, 
existing, and change of the action. 
From the temporal view context information falls into 
two categories: static and dynamic. In administrative view 
it can be divided as mutable and immutable. 
Administrative action can change the values of both 
mutable and immutable portions, whereas access can 
change values of the mutable portions only. Examples of 
static context are system platform, operation system. 
Network bandwidth is immutable, it is initially 
determined by hardware configuration, and can be 
reconfigured by administrator. But the current available 
bandwidth is mutable because both current online users 
and devices can change it.  
We need both static and dynamic (or immutable and 
mutable) portions for information security.  
The so-called usage context is a context in a usage 
process. For instance, in a typical access control, in order 
to determine the access permission we should consider 
subjects, objects, time, location, environment, reasons, 
and so on. These issues are all related to the context of the 
access control. 
Considering a QoS system, when the users are less, 
all users can get high quality service.  As users increase to 
a certain extent, the system response speed is likely to 
decline, the network available bandwidth will become 
smaller. The information should be dealt with promptly 
and corresponded timely. The contexts can cap with it, 
but the immutable conditions of UCON cannot. 
In linguistics Frege brought out two important 
principles: (1) the context principle. Words have meaning 
only in the context of a sentence; and (2) the principle of 
compositionality. The meaning of a sentence is 
determined by the meanings of its constituents [18]. We 
try to apply Frege’s principles in computer security, 
called as security context principle.  
Security context principle: The security without 
application context is nonsense.  
This means that the definition of security is always 
relative to an application context. Without the context we 
cannot know if the information is secure or not. 
Information considered secure in a particular application 
context may be in a dangerous state in another context. 
 
3     Contextual usage control model 
  
This section presents the proposed contextual usage 
control model (CUC), which explicitly includes context 
component and has capability of dynamic adaptation to 
the changes in the environmental context. Like the 
subjects and objects in UCON, the usage context 
component will be characterized in attributes.  
 
3.1  The system components  
 
Fig. 1 is a system components diagram of CUC. 
There are seven components around the usage transaction: 
subjects set S with attributes set SA, objects set O with 
attributes set OA, contexts set X with attributes set XA, 
rights set R, authorizations set A, and management set M. 
Here SA and OA are identical to ATT(S) and ATT(O) in [4] 
respectively. So XA can be denoted by ATT(X). 
 
 
Figure 1 CUC composition diagram 
 
Definition 2 (CUC System) A CUC system is a 7-
tuple: 
CUC ∷= (S, O, R, X, A, B, M) 
where S is the set of subjects with attributes; O set of 
objects with attributes; X set of contexts with attributes; 
R  set of rights; A：R×O∣(X,B)→S, set of authorizations, 
means to grant R to S to use O under the conditions X and 
B; B ： S×R∣(B,X)→O, set of obligations, means 
S apply R to O under the conditions B and X; M ∷= 
( M║A, M║B ) is a set of management functions, 
where  M║A  means the  M  loosely couples  A, 
and M║B  the M loosely coupling B.  
For S, O, R, A, and B, more detailed descriptions are 
in [4, 5] because they are inherited directly from UCON. 
Following is a brief explanation of the components.  
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Subjects set S 
S is a set of subjects. A subject is an entity which 
takes actions on objects. A subject is characterized by its 
attributes. Examples of subject attributes are identity, role, 
reputation, credits, and so on. 
Objects set O 
O is a set of objects. An object is the entity that 
subjects can hold rights on. An object is characterized by 
its attributes. Examples of object attributes are identity, 
value, role permission, and so on. 
Rights set R 
R is a set of rights. A right is a privilege held or 
applied by subjects for objects. Rights consist of usage 
functions enabling subjects to access objects. From the 
viewpoint of access control, the right can enable subjects 
to access objects in a specific mode, such as to read or 
write. 
For original UCON this is the moment to determine if 
subjects hold a right when the subjects try to access. 
Unlike UCON, CUC clearly distinguishes between 
authorization and application of rights, so that it supports 
directly the visualization of rights. 
Contexts set X 
X is a set of usage contexts. A context is 
characterized by its attributes. Context attributes are 
properties or constraints that can influence a usage 
transaction. Context attributes are divided as either static 
and dynamic, or mutable and immutable.  
From administrative view contexts did not only 
inherit the conditions element of UCON, but also added 
new portions, e.g. the mutable attributes. The mutable 
attributes of contexts are just-in-time information that is 
relevant to usage transaction. So the CUC decision based 
on contexts can be more reasonable and adaptive, and 
easily offer fine-grained control. 
In the QoS scenario the system current states as 
contexts attributes should be used to make usage decision, 
the service quality got by low-level users will decline, but 
the service quality of high-level users will be unchanged. 
In UCON, as decision factors, conditions exclude the 
mutable information, so do the individual subject and 
object which are involved in the usage transaction. So the 
usage cannot be controlled.  
Authorization set A 
A is a set of predicate authorizations. Authorization is 
to bind subjects and rights in a usage context. 
Obligations set B 
B is a set of predicate obligations. Obligations which 
can be done by a subject either before, during, or after the 
access are requirements that the subject as a principal in a 
usage context has to do.  
Management set M 
M is a set of management functions. M is divided into 
two categories: one is for attributes management, and 
another for rules management. The functions for 
management of attributes of subjects, objects and contexts 
include addition of new attributes, removal of existing 
attributes, updating and evaluation of values of attributes, 
store of critical attributes values, and so on. Changes of 
attributes values can occur in three stages: before, 
ongoing and after a usage transaction. The functions for 
management of the usage control rules are used for the 
rules of authorizations decisions and right exercise 
decisions. 
From the operational view, M can also fall into either 
administrative functions, or run-time functions. The 
addition/remove of attributes, for example, is 
administrative function, and evaluation of attributes 
values run-time function. 
In original UCON the management functions are 
implicit, and only focus on evaluation of values of the 
subjects and objects attributes. The subjects, objects, and 
their attributes are static (predefined), and the values of 
attributes can be changed only. The component conditions 
of UCON model is separated from the management, and 
dealt with as administrative issues [5]. 
On the contrary, CUC defines and enhances the 
management functions explicitly so that it can co-
ordinately combine the access control and management. 
The combination of control and management is a trend of 
information security. Of course it needs more work on it. 
 
3.2  The system architecture  
 
Fig. 2 is an alternative diagram of CUC which shows 
the system architecture. The architecture of CUC consists 
of two functional blocks: the management block (MB), 
and the control block (CB). MB is made of four 
components: S with SA, O with OA, X with XA, and the 
management set M. CB consists of three components and 
two decision points: A, B, R, the authorization decision 
point (ADP), and the right exercise decision point (EDP). 
There is loose coupling between the management and 
control blocks. In MB subjects, objects, contexts, and 
their attributes are managed by M. The loose coupling 
means any change of either S, or SA, or O, or OA, or X, or 
XA should not bring on changes of the access control rules 
and algorithms in CB, and vice versa. 
 
 
Figure 2 CUC architecture diagram 
  
3.3  The activities 
 
For convenience we redraw CUC model in Fig. 3. 
The timeline at the middle of Fig. 3a indicates the 
direction of time-series activities, and the components at 
the two layers (upper and lower) are activity decision 
factors. Fig. 3a emphasizes the activities of right grant 
and application based on the attributes of subject, object 
and context, and Fig. 3b the architecture of decision-point 
and policy-enforcement-point. 
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a) Logic of activities 
 
b) Decision-activities 
Figure 3 CUC action relationship model 
 
3.4  Decision continuity and attributes mutability 
 
Continuity and mutability are two important 
properties that information systems require. In UCON, the 
decision continuity and attributes mutability were shown 
in Fig. 2 of [8].  
 
 
a) Decision continuity 
 
 
b) Attributes mutability 
Figure 4 CUC’s continuity and mutability 
CUC supports continuity and mutability as well. The 
decision continuity in CUC is similar in UCON (Figure 
4a), but the attributes mutability in CUC is different from 
UCON’s (Fig. 4b). As shown in Fig. 4b, the attributes 
mutability applies in both right grant and application 
stages. Because there are three classes of attributes, 
belonging to the subjects, objects and contexts, the 
attribute-update function should support the update of 
these three classes of attributes in two stages. 
 
3.5  The CUC family 
 
The UCON classification was based on the decision 
factors (authorizations, obligations, and conditions), 
attributes mutability, and decision continuity. Park and 
Sandhu enumerated 16 basic members of UCON family 
[5].  
The criteria of CUC classification are similar to 
UCON except that the attributes of contexts can allow 
updates, and the time series is divided into two stages: 
right grant and application (see Tab. 1). In Tab. 1 a 
decision process denoted 0 means that no updates are 
needed (this case is corresponding to immutable 
attributes).  Process denoted 1, 2, or 3 means updates are 
possible before, ongoing, or after the right grant and 
application respectively (these are corresponding to 
mutable attributes). Besides that, cases marked Y in Tab. 
1 mean they are likely useful in practice, otherwise 
marked N. It has more members of family than UCON 
because CUC’s usage process consists of two 
distinguished stages, the grant and application, and 
updates can be made in both processes. 
We can formally define the CUC family members as 
UCON does. In this way, for example, CUCpreA00 model is 
identical to UCONpreA0 defined in [5]. 
 Definition 3 (CUCpreX00 model) The CUCpreX00 
model is made of the following components: 
S, O, X, R, ATT(S), ATT(O), ATT(X), and preX; 
Allowed(s, o, x, r)  => preX(ATT(s), ATT(o), ATT(x), r). 
Where ATT(y) is the notation of attributes of entity y, 
and y∈(S, O, X, s, o, x). The functional predicate preX 
employs ATT(s), ATT(o), ATT(x), and r to make a usage 
decision. And allowed(s, o, x, r) indicates that right r is 
granted for subject s to apply to object o under the 
context x.  
For completeness there should be many definitions. 
We give only a few definitions in this paper because it is 
straightforward to derive the rest by the similar way. 
 
Table 1 The CUC family 
Factors 

















preA Y Y N Y Y Y N Y 
onA Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
preB Y Y N Y Y Y N Y 
onB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
preX Y N Y N Y N Y Y 
onX Y N Y N Y N Y Y 
38                                                                                                                                                                                                              Technical Gazette 21, 1(2014), 35-41 
X. Luo, L. Li, W. Luo                                                                                                                                                                                 Kontekstualni model praćenja uporabe 
4     Formal description 
 
Generally spoking, formal description needs to use 
certain language and methodology. Zhang et al. first 
conducted an UCON formal description using extended 
TLA (temporal logic of action) [8]. Then, Helge et al. 
used ITL (interval temporal logic), and Martinelli et al. 
used the Policy Language based on Process Algebra, 
respectively. For these methods each has its advantages 
[7]. 
[19] employed an algebra approach based on those 
introduced in [20] and [21] to describe formal syntax and 
semantics of attribute-based access control policy. Their 
method is simple, direct, and easy to understand and 
translate into computer algorithms language. We also 
adopt their methods. 
 
4.1  Basic concepts 
 
To formally describe the CUC model we first define 
some basic terms. 
Definition 4 (Entity) An entity is an existing or real 
thing as a particular and discrete unit. 
Definition 5 (Object) All entities to be the goal or 
end of an effort or activity in a system are called objects 
(passive entities).  
Definition 6 (Subject) A subject is an entity that 
requests or executes access right on object(s) (active 
entity, e.g. user and process). 
Definition 7 (Access Right) All usage permissions of 
objects that are granted to a subject in a system are called 
access rights (e.g. read, write, execute). 
Definition 8 (Attribute) An attribute is a quality 
proper to a particular event or thing. 
Each subject has a set of attributes, and each attribute 
of a subject has a value. So does each object and each 
context. 
Assuming an entity named as eName with an attribute 
named as atb, the value of atb is denoted as eName.atb 
and eName.atb∈domain(eName), where domain(eName) 
is the value domain of eName, and null 
∉ domain(eName). That eName.atb is equal to null 
indicates that eName does not have the attribute atb, or 
the value of atb has not to be assigned after eName 
creation. 
 
4.2  The CUC Model 
 
In this section for convenience the following 
notations are adopted:  
S – Set of subjects, s – a particular subject; 
O – Set of objects, o – a particular object; 
X – Set of contexts, x – a particular context; 
R – Set of rights, r – a particular right; 
D – Set of decision, d – a particular decision, and d∈ ( A, 
B ), where A is set of authorizations, B set of obligations. 
Definition 9 (Attribute-value Pair) An attribute-
value pair is an attribute and a value pair linked by a 
operator in the form a_id ○ val, where a_id is the attribute 
identifier, val the alpha-numerical value, and the operator 
○ an element in the set of  
，，，，，，，，，，，， ⊇⊃⊄⊆⊂∉∈>≥=≤<{ dominate }. 
Definition 10 (Evaluation circumstance) An 
evaluation circumstance e is a quadruple (Savp, Oavp, Xavp, 
rreq), where Yavp is a set of attribute-value pairs of entity Y, 
Y∈(S, O, X), and rreq is the requested right. 
Definition 11 (CUC policy(s)) A CUC policy p = (S, 
O, X, R, d) specifies that a rights set R applied by a 
subjects set S to an objects set O is improved  by the 
decision d according to the policy p in a contexts set X. 
Where S, O, and X are specified by multiple-attribute sets 
respectively, and decision d∈ ( A, B ) 
where, the multiple-attribute set was defined in [19]. 
The evaluation result of an entity multiple-attribute set Y 
in an evaluation circumstance e can be represented as ‖Y‖e. 
Definition 12 (Applicable policy) A CUC policy p = 
(S, O, X, R, d) is applicable in an evaluation circumstance 
e if: ‖S‖e∧‖O‖e∧‖X‖e∧‖R‖e = true. 
Definition 13 (Policy(s) evaluation result) For a 
given evaluation circumstance e, a set of CUC policy, 
denoted as P = { p1, p2, …, pn }, returns a decisions set D 
as the evaluation results: D =‖P‖e = { d︱pi = (S, O, X, A, 
d), i=1,…,n;‖S‖e∧‖O‖e∧‖X‖e∧‖R‖e = true }. 
All policies in the CUC policy set P are evaluated 
against e. A policy is applicable to e if all multiple-
attribute sets of subjects, objects and contexts are within 
those specified by e and the requested right falls within 
the policy's right set of e. The decisions set of applicable 
policies is returned as the result of the policy set 
evaluation. 
Definition 14 (Core CUC) A core CUC model is a 
system that can form CUC policies. 
Definition 15 (Management function) The CUC 
management function, denoted by m(S, O, X), is an 
attributes function mainly to update or meter attributes of 
subjects, objects and contexts, and can be called before, 
ongoing, and after exercising a CUC policy p = (S, O, X, 
R, d).  
As an option, the management function can be 
employed for post-process of usage control such as to 
analyze and store the decision in practice, the rationale of 
decision, and other information. 
CUC management set M = {m1, m2, … , mk} is a set 
of management functions m1, m2, … , mk. 
Definition 16 (Complete CUC) A complete CUC 
model is a system that can form CUC policies and has 
management functions. 
In this section by using algebra approach and 
beginning from semantics we define CUC system to form 
CUC policies. So the description should be called policy 
description too. 
 
4.3  Model application 
 
Definition 17 (Usage) A usage U = (s, o, r, x) is a 
quadruple specifying the subject s apply right r to object o 
in the context x. 
Definition 18(Usage control) Usage control is the 
full control of processes including getting and applying 
right r on object o in context x for subject s in a usage U 
= (s, o, r, x). 
A usage process consists of two stages: the 
authorization (also called right grant), and the application 
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of right. So does the usage control: decision of 
authorization, and decision of right application. 
The process of authorization decision is a practice of 
a CUC policy p = (S, O, X, R, d), where the d is a decision 
of authorization. The procedure is as follows: 
Step 1: (before authorization) to update attributes of 
subject, object and context by calling management 
functions. 
Step 2: (ongoing authorization) to authorize by using 
authorization predicate, and meter attributes by calling 
management functions. 
Step 3: (after authorization) to update attributes of 
subject, object and context by calling management 
functions. If authorized, go into right application; else, 
quit. 
The process of right application decision is a practice 
of a CUC policy p = (S, O, X, R, d), where the d is a 
decision of right application. The procedure of single 
right-application decision is as follows: 
Step 1: (before application) to update attributes of 
subject, object and context by calling management 
functions. 
Step 2: (ongoing application) to authorize by using 
authorization predicate, and meter attributes by calling 
management functions. 
Step 3: (after application) to update attributes of 
subject, object and context by calling management 
functions. 
 
5     Comparison 
5.1  UCON 
 
Comparing UCON, in CUC there are three 
improvements: replacement of UCON conditions, two 
stage decision, and management function.  
That the contexts introduced by CUC substitute the 
conditions of UCON is significant. One of the benefits is 
dynamic. Contrary to the immutable conditions of UCON, 
the contexts of CUC are dynamic or mutable. As a 
consequence of the activities of subjects and objects in 
usage transaction, the situation may be changed and 
reflects as context information which can be employed in 
usage decision process. CUC is more in conformity with 
the actual situations. In UCON, a decision of usage is 
based on the individual subject and object plus systemic 
or environmental conditions (limitations or constraints), 
that makes UCON insensitive to context; whereas in CUC, 
the conditions for making decision are checked involving 
multiple subjects and objects, and the evaluation of 
systems and environment takes more current circumstance 
into account, and it better adapts to the dynamic changes. 
Another benefit is that the descriptions of CUC are 
similar to UCON’s, so many of research results of UCON 
are suitable for CUC directly or after a slight modification.  
Example 1. Multilevel security policies  
Multilevel security policies are also called as BLP 
policies. CUCpreA00 can be employed to represent this 
typical mandatory access control (MAC) policies.  
Let S be the set of subject s, O the set of object o, 
and L a security labels lattice with dominance relation ≥. 
The presentation of multilevel security policies is 
identical to realization in [5] by using UCONpreA0.  
Example 2. ACL policies  
The ACL policies can be presented by CUCpre00 and 
also identical to realization made in using UCONpreA0 [5].  
Finally, Conditions in UCON are not characterized by 
its attributes, and contexts in CUC are. CUC is truly 
attributes-based.  
Usage decision is divided into two stages, the 
authorization stage and the application of right stage. The 
two-stage control is more meticulous, and its logic more 
clear. For example, let’s consider a case of usage. A file 
server supports 1000 files download concurrently with a 
limit that one user can only download 3 files at the same 
time. Supposing 400 users are downloading 999 files, the 
401st authorized user tries to download 2 files, and the 
second one will fail. It is a system capability issue in 
CUC. But in original UCON, it may be explained as a 
system capability issue or a problem of insufficient user 
rights. 
In CUC the authorization and right-application are 
ordered, that is, the authorization is implemented first, 
and after the successful authorization right-application 
kicks in. It truly meets the objectives and requirements of 
information security: confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. Users must be authorized first, because 
confidentiality, integrity and availability are for 
authorized users only [19].  
The management block makes the attributes-update 
explicit which is implicit in UCON. It not only separates 
the functions of the modules more clearly, but also 
combines the management and control to some extent. It 
is consistent with the development trend of information 
security. 
 
5.2  Others 
 
In this section we try to compare the CUC with some 
approaches proposed by current researches to improve the 
UCON model. 
Zhao et al. (2007) proposed a new access model 
called as TUCON (Times-based Usage Control) for 
prevention of digital resources abuse [9]. In TUCON a 
time variable is introduced into UCON, and maximum 
times defined as consumption constraints. Zhao et al. 
approach is implemented easily by defining a new 
attribute of context in CUC.  
Zhang Hongjun (2009) proposed Geography Usage 
Control (GEO-UCON) model to deal with GEO DBMS 
access control [10]. In GEO-UCON a geospatial factor is 
added into UCON to ensure data security in location-
based services and mobile applications. Zhang’s approach 
can be dealt with by adding geospatial attribute of context 
into CUC. 
Bai et al. (2011) extended usage control model to 
context-aware in mobile computing environments [11]. 
Bai et al. introduced two new components into UCON 
model: contexts and states. The new model called as 
ConUCON takes these new components plus obligations 
on access decisions. CUC model is simpler and more 
general-purpose than ConUCON model. Situations 
information is included by context information, and the 
states are the results of contexts evaluation. As a model, 
CUC can do these ConUCON can do. 
Almutairi and Siewe (2011) proposed another 
context-aware usage control model in pervasive 
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computing systems [12]. Employing context information, 
CA-UCON can invoke some special actions to adapt to 
the environments changes. The approach for CA-UCON 
to employ contexts is different from CUC, and not 
general-purpose. 
 
6     Conclusion and future work 
 
In this paper an important model of the access control, 
UCON, was analysed in-depth, and its deficiency to 
capture the situation and reflect the dynamic nature 
pointed. The concept of action context and the principle 
of security context were introduced, and the generalized 
system and environment in UCON replaced by the 
context to solve the dynamic deficiency; management 
functions were also introduced to combine the 
management and control. The extended UCON is 
contextual usage control (CUC), and consists of two 
functional blocks, the management block manages 
attributes of subjects, objects and contexts, and the control 
block governs the usage. There are some loose couples 
between the management and control blocks. After the 
conceptual description of CUC, an algebra approach was 
used for formal description of CUC syntax and semantics. 
For CUC more work is needed. Firstly, it is a concept 
model, its properties of CUC models are in open, and the 
formal description is essential. Secondly, there still are 
some restrictions. For example, the management functions 
can be used to remove existing attributes, but the loose 
couple restrict the changes do not bring on changes of the 
access control rules and algorithms in CB. Finally, the 
implementation issues also need to be further studied.  
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